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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of Virginia restricts the use of eminent domain such
that “no more private property may be taken than necessary to achieve the
stated public use.”1 Under most circumstances, the necessity requirement for
any particular taking is not difficult to show. The plan for a new road dictates
the location of its roadbed and, therefore, what property must be taken—
taking the land under the roadbed is necessary. This is not always the case,
however, with takings to meet environmental obligations. Where the
condemning agency has the option to meet an environmental requirement
either by condemning private land or through other means, is the
condemnation truly necessary? Does an arbitrary choice of location, not
dictated by the necessities of the project and its public purpose, create an
unconstitutional taking? These questions arise when transportation projects,
for which the Clean Water Act and its state-level equivalents mandate some
form of compensatory mitigation to offset destruction of streams, achieve
that compensatory mitigation by condemning the stream land of private
citizens. The Clean Water Act offers several alternatives to agencyconducted mitigation on private land, none of which would require the use
of eminent domain. Additionally, the Clean Water Act does not dictate the
precise location of required compensatory mitigation, only that it be
completed in the same watershed. Do agencies, presented with a range of
options to achieve their public purpose, only one of which requires eminent
domain, violate the Virginia Constitution where they choose voluntarily to
use eminent domain?
This paper will briefly examine the history of using eminent domain
to reach broad environmental goals in the United States. The paper will then
focus on the narrower constitutional problem presented by using eminent
domain to meet compensatory mitigation requirements in Virginia by
examining the case of a Southwest Virginia road project and the conflict
between the constitutional imperatives of eminent domain law and
condemning agencies subject to environmental regulations that require the
use of real property. Finally, the paper will present a set of conclusions
designed to guide thinking on this complex issue.

1.

VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).
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I. BACKGROUND
From its earliest inception, the power of expropriation (i.e., the
taking of private property by the State) has been widely recognized as an
inherent right of the nation-state. As this practice began to take shape in
English common law, the property rights of individuals were initially few
and rarely enforced by judicial bodies. Beginning in 1066 with the Norman
invasion and subsequent conquest of England by William the Conqueror, the
property rights attached to all seized lands under the common law were
vested solely in the monarch.2 These rights were often then distributed to
Norman vassals, Anglo-Saxon supporters, and church officials through the
granting of “fiefs”—estates of land—in exchange for monetary payment or
other various forms of service.3 While this system appeared to provide
individual property rights in theory, the monarch still possessed absolute
authority over land, and fiefs were often revoked with or without cause.4
Throughout this period, the administration of justice under English common
law appeared in many ways to be arbitrary and inequitable.
Such was the status quo under English law until 1215, when a littleknown ruler by the name of King John signed a series of documents known
as the Articles of Magna Carta.5 The Magna Carta, as it has now become
known, established many of the fundamental rights that are now guaranteed
in constitutions and jurisprudence across the world. Chief among these are
the rights of due process, habeas corpus, and property ownership.6 For the
purposes of this discussion, we will examine the clauses related to property
ownership.
Clauses 28 and 39 of the Magna Carta guaranteed property
protections under the English common law. The following translations are
provided by British Museum manuscript scholar G.R.C. Davis:
(28) No constable or other royal official shall take corn or
other movable goods from any man without immediate
payment, unless the seller voluntarily offers postponement
of this.7
(39) No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped
of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or
2. Bruce L. Benson, The Evolution of Eminent Domain: A Remedy for Market Failure
or an Effort to Limit Government Power and Government Failure?, 12 INDEP. REV. 423, 424
(2008).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 424–25.
5. Id. at 425.
6. Id. at 425–26.
7. G.R.C. DAVIS, MAGNA CARTA 23–33 (4th rev. ed. 1963). The original Latin
document did not have enumerated clauses. These have been inserted by the translator for
clarity.
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deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed
with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.8
As shown in these excerpts, the Magna Carta placed rudimentary,
yet revolutionary, restraints on the monarch’s ability to exercise his power of
expropriation. The document required that payment for taken goods was to
occur “immediately” and that no person could be deprived of “rights or
possessions” without due process of law. And although such rights are
largely taken for granted in Western democracies today, the concept of
fundamental rights is a fairly recent legal development.
In the centuries following its ratification, many of the various rights
and principles contained within the Magna Carta served as guideposts for
Enlightenment-era thinkers such as John Locke and Sir Edward Coke,
individuals who were largely responsible for fanning the flames of political
revolution throughout much of Europe and the United States.9 The ideas
enshrined in the Magna Carta can be found, for example, in both the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, as well as the United States Constitution.10 Prior to
adoption of the federal constitution, however, such ideas were given life in
the colonies through the language of state constitutions. The Virginia
Constitution is a special example of such language and ideas, as it would later
serve as a template for the U.S. Constitution.11
A. Brief History of Eminent Domain in Virginia
The constitutional history of the Commonwealth is one that spans
across seven major iterations. Virginia’s first Constitution, adopted in 1776
(less than one month before the signing of the Declaration of
Independence12), described property rights as “inherent” to all and stated that
the “means of acquiring and possessing property” could not be infringed by
any compact.13 More specifically, the 1776 Constitution stated that
Virginians “cannot be . . . deprived of their property for public uses, without
their own consent, or that of the representatives so elected.”14 The 1776
Constitution also preserved the right to a jury trial in all disputes relating to
8. Id.
9. John Steele Gordon, Magna Carta: The Birth Certificate of the Rule of Law, AM.
ENTER. INST. (Jun. 18, 2015), https://www.aei.org/articles/magna-carta-the-birth-certificateof-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/8DBK-2AJF].
10. Id.
11. For context, see First Virginia Constitution, June 29, 1776, EDUC. LIB. VA.,
http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/va_constitution
[https://perma.cc/2TUN-WPVR].
12. ARMISTEAD R. LONG, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: AN ANNOTATED EDITION, 109
(1901) (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, § 1).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 110 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, § 6).
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or concerning property.15 And while the phrase “just compensation” was not
present in the 1776 Constitution, the Virginia Supreme Court nevertheless
declared that “fair compensation must always be made to the individual” in
order for a taking to be “lawful.”16 Therefore, Virginia has required just
compensation and public use since as early as the state’s independence from
Great Britain.
In the 1820s, limited representation in Virginia’s increasinglypopulous western counties led to the adoption of Virginia’s second
Constitution in 1830.17 The Constitution of 1830 made a number of revisions,
primarily to address issues such as voting rights and the aforementioned
malapportionment. However, the Constitution of 1830 also added important
provisions relating to individual property rights, such as an explicit “just
compensation” requirement in the state constitution’s takings clause.18
The next three iterations of the state constitution were adopted in
1851, 1864, and 1870, respectively.19 And while these documents did not
present any major changes to the state’s exercise of eminent domain, they
preserved the “public use” and “just compensation” requirements of the 1776
and 1830 constitutions.20
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the citizens’ rights under federal and
state law were often not parallel. The rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
for example, were only applicable under federal law during this period. As a
consequence, the “public use” and “just compensation” protections of the
Fifth Amendment were not guaranteed to citizens under state law. The
decision to echo rights in the U.S. Constitution (e.g., in Virginia’s eminent
domain clauses) was not required by state legislatures at the time. In fact,
Virginia is unique in that its Bill of Rights so closely aligns with that of the
United States Constitution, most likely because Virginia’s constitution
served as inspiration for the federal constitution, which was drafted some
thirteen years later.21 Such close resemblance was not uniform throughout
the country, however, and prior to Reconstruction, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the idea that the protections contained within the Bill of
Rights should be guaranteed at the state level.22
However, this changed in 1868 with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment—specifically, the amendment’s Due Process Clause and the

15. Id. (citing VA. CONST. of 1776, § 11).
16. Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. 245, 264–65 (1828) (emphasis added).
17. See The Constitutional Convention of 1829–30, W. VA. DEP’T ARTS, CULTURE, &
HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/history/government/182930cc.html [https://perma.cc/N7BY
-GB8L].
18. Id. (quoting VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 11).
19. See VA. CONST. OF 1870; VA. CONST. OF 1864; VA. CONST. OF 1851.
20. See VA. CONST. OF 1870; VA. CONST. OF 1864; VA. CONST. OF 1851.
21. See First Virginia Constitution, supra note 11.
22. See Barron v. City of Balt., 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
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subsequent arrival of the incorporation doctrine.23 Under the theory of
incorporation, certain rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights must be
guaranteed at the state level in order to preserve due process for all citizens.
Although there is debate as to the Supreme Court’s first application of the
incorporation doctrine, the most likely candidate is Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, a case which, pertinent to our
discussion, dealt with the appropriation of land owned by private
individuals.24 The facts were as follows: In 1880, the Chicago City Council
passed an ordinance that provided for the widening of a local street.25 In order
to accomplish this, however, the city was required to take property owned by
certain landowners, as well as a portion of the right of way owned by a local
railroad company.26 The city filed a petition for condemnation of the relevant
parcels and right of way, with the railroad company being admitted as a
defendant in the proceeding.27 At trial, the jury awarded the defendant
railroad company with a nominal just compensation award of $1.28
On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to remand the jury
determination, stating that the statute at issue in the case, which allowed for
the taking of railroad rights of way, fell under the umbrella of the state’s
police powers.29 As a consequence, the state of Illinois did not have to
demonstrate an award of just compensation in order for the taking to be valid.
Nevertheless, Justice Harlan, in his majority opinion, crafted the principle
that has since become known as the “incorporation doctrine.” The Court
concluded that states must satisfy the “just compensation” requirements of
the Takings Clause in order to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process protections:
[A] judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by
statute, whereby private property is taken for the
State…without compensation made or secured to the owner,
is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process
of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States . . . .30
After the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the Takings Clause, the
Virginia Constitution went through two major iterations. In 1902, the
language relating to the State’s power of eminent domain remained relatively
23. For a more thorough discussion of the incorporation doctrine, see Bryan H.
Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1867–1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153 (2009).
24. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
25. Id. at 230.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 254–55.
30. City of Chicago, 165 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added).
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vague, maintaining that “[N]o person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.”31 By 1971, however, the Constitution of
Virginia fully incorporated the public use requirement, stating that the
General Assembly would refrain from passing any law “whereby private
property [is] . . . taken or damaged for public uses, without just compensation
. . . .”32 Notably, the 1971 Constitution granted explicit authority to the
General Assembly in order to determine what constituted a “public use” in
the Commonwealth.33 As discussed later in Section III.B, voters later rejected
this language in a 2012 constitutional referendum.
B. History of Using Eminent Domain to Achieve Environmental Goals
The power of eminent domain is an incident of sovereignty. It
“appertains to every independent government. It requires no constitutional
recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty.”34 Although the concept of
eminent domain is patently enshrined in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, in reality this clause represents a limitation on that power, rather
than a grant. When analyzing what the government can and cannot do under
eminent domain law, it is more appropriate to look to the extent of the limits
rather than the extent of the grant of power.
Congress has codified the precise limits on multiple occasions. One
of the earliest such examples can be found in an 1888 federal statute
authorizing the then-Secretary of War to condemn land or public buildings
for the maintaining and improvement of rivers and harbors.35 Later in that
same year, Congress enacted far-reaching legislation that appeared to greatly
expand the authority of the federal government to initiate condemnation
proceedings. Under the Condemnation Act of 1888, as it has now become
known, the government could seek condemnation proceedings in order to
fulfill any “public uses” whenever it was, in the opinion of the government
agency, “necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so.”36
The Condemnation Act was broader than its immediate predecessor
in three respects: First, the Act allowed for any federal official to initiate
condemnation proceedings, as opposed to the earlier 1888 legislation, which
could only be initiated by the Secretary of War.37 Second, the Act allowed
for condemnation in order to satisfy any public purpose.38 Finally, the Act
31. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. I, § 11.
32. VA. CONST. of 1971, art. I, §11.
33. Id.
34. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
35. Act of Apr. 24, 1888, ch. 194, 25 Stat. 94.
36. Condemnation Act, ch. 728, 25 Stat. 357 (1888) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 3113
(2002)).
37. Compare id. (the Act allowed for condemnation proceedings to be initiated by any
federal official), with ch. 194, 25 Stat. at 94, supra note 35 (condemnation proceedings could
only be initiated by the Secretary of War).
38. Id.
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allowed federal officials to proceed in either state or federal court, the latter
of which not being an option under the earlier legislation.39
In the late 1930s, the constitutionality of this Act was challenged
when the Federal Works Agency (FWA) and Postmaster General condemned
private land in order to construct a federal courthouse and post office in the
city of Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Upon granting certiorari, the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held that the Act was indeed constitutional and,
pertinent to our discussion, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
made federal powers of eminent domain supreme.40
While the Condemnation Act laid the groundwork for any future
takings related to “public purposes,” the question of whether environmental
protection itself constituted a public use under federal law was initially
avoided. Indeed, prior to the Act’s passage, the federal government had
already set aside land for the primary purpose of environmental preservation,
avoiding the necessity of using condemnation for this particular purpose. In
1872, for example, Congress established what is now Yellowstone National
Park using federal land located in the then-Territories of Wyoming and
Montana.41 In the example of Yellowstone, however, the issue of
condemnation was not reached because the boundaries of the park were
entirely contained within federally owned property. In 1903, some thirty
years after Yellowstone, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive
order establishing Pelican Island National Wildlife Refuge, the first of its
kind in the nation.42 Like Yellowstone, however, the issue of condemnation
was avoided because the land comprising the island refuge was classified as
federal property.43
1. The Weeks Act
At the turn of the 20th century, however, the early foundations of
modern-day environmental law were beginning to take shape, and with it the
question of whether to use eminent domain in order to achieve federal policy
objectives. In 1905, Congress signaled a new era in environmental protection
with the formation of the United States National Forest Service (“NFS”).44
39. Id.
40. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 240 (1946) (“The considerations that made
it appropriate for the Constitution to declare that the Constitution of the United States, and the
laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land
make it appropriate to recognize that the power of eminent domain, when exercised by
Congress within its constitutional powers, is equally supreme.”).
41. Act of Mar.1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32–33.
42. Pelican Island Reservation for protection of native birds, THEODORE ROOSEVELT
CTR. AT DICKINSON STATE UNIV., https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/DigitalLibrary/Record.aspx?libID=o286619 [https://perma.cc/QBW3-LW9D].
43. 1903-First Federal Bird Reservation, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/invasives/volunteerstrainingmodule/swf/nwrsystem/1903.html [https://
perma.cc/9W94-BPNM].
44. Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 288, 33 Stat. 628 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 472).
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Its mission: “To sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the Nation’s
forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations.”45
To accomplish this objective, in 1911, Congress passed the “Weeks Act”—
named for its co-sponsor former Massachusetts Congressman John Weeks—
which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to “examine, locate, and
recommend for purchase such lands . . . within the watersheds of navigable
streams as . . . may be necessary to the regulation of flow of navigable
streams . . . .”46
Section 7 of the Act authorized the Secretary to purchase such tracts
of land after receiving approval from an agency commission.47 Using this
method of land acquisition, the newly formed NFS, under the direction of the
Secretary of Agriculture, was able to acquire much of the land that now
comprises the various national forests of the Eastern United States.48 In the
Eastern and Southern regions, NFS-designated areas average approximately
46% non-federal land within their boundaries, while areas in the Western
United States average roughly 10% non-federal acreage.49
The Weeks Act continues to serve as a means for the Forest Service
to acquire privately owned property. Additionally, in the decades since the
Act’s passage, Congress has conferred additional powers to the Secretary of
Agriculture, such as the right to acquire land within or adjacent to designated
wilderness areas,50 wild and scenic river corridors,51 and certain segments of
designated National Trails.52 Today, the Forest Service manages roughly 193
million acres of protected forests and grasslands throughout the United
States.53
While the Weeks Act provided for the designation of protected
places in order to serve people (e.g., NFS’s mission to protect spaces for
current and future generations), there were no legislative mechanisms at the
turn of the century to specifically protect wildlife. The few wildlife refuges
that had been created, for example, were almost entirely via executive order.
In 1929, Congress passed the first piece of legislation specifically authorizing
the acquisition of privately owned lands for wildlife habitat: the Migratory
Bird Conservation Act (“MBCA”).54 The MBCA authorized the Secretary to

45. About the Agency, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/about-agency [https://
perma.cc/2MLF-GJRE].
46. Weeks Act, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 961, 962 (1911) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 515).
47. Id.
48. CONG. RES. SERV., RL34273, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: ACQUISITION AND
DISPOSAL AUTHORITIES 5 (2019).
49. Id.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(c) (2018).
51. Id. § 1277.
52. Id. § 1244.
53. By the Numbers, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/about-agency/
newsroom/by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/WQ9D-VUMA].
54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 715–715(r) (1925); Edward J. Heisel, Comment, Biodiversity and
Federal Land Ownership: Mapping a Strategy for the Future, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 238
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purchase areas recommended by an agency commission as “necessary for the
conservation of migratory game birds.”55 These areas would be acquired by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”). Through the MBCA, acreage
could be designated as National Wildlife Refuges, just as prior refuges had
been designated through executive orders. Both the refuges created by
executive order and those authorized by the commission would fall under the
jurisdiction of FWS. Soon after its creation, a subsequent bill required
waterfowl hunters to purchase the right to hunt in these protected refuges.
Funds from this program were then used to fund condemnation awards
supplied to private landowners under the terms of the MBCA.56
2. Shenandoah National Park
Congress also used eminent domain to acquire the land necessary to
create several of the United States’ National Parks. In February of 1925,
Congress passed an act authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to determine
appropriate boundaries of suitable lands in the Blue Ridge Mountains of
Virginia and the Smokey Mountains of North Carolina and Tennessee for the
creation of national parks.57 The Blue Ridge Mountain lands identified by the
Secretary would ultimately become the core of Shenandoah National Park.58
The Act, ordering that this land should become Shenandoah, additionally
provided that no federal funds should be used to acquire the land; only public
or private donations would be allowed.59 Because of this restriction on the
use of federal funds, the federal government partnered with the
Commonwealth of Virginia to acquire the land. Virginia would acquire the
land and subsequently donate it to the United States for the creation of the
park.60
Virginia, in order to begin the process, created the State Commission
on Conservation and Development by act of the General Assembly in March
of 1926. The Commission was authorized to acquire, by purchase or through
the use of eminent domain power, “any areas, properties, or lands of scenic
beauty, recreational utility, or historical interest which, in the judgment of
the commission, should be preserved and maintained for the use, observation,
education, health, and pleasure of the people of Virginia.”61 Additionally, the

(1998); See also Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and
Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1994).
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 715(a), (c).
56. See Hiesel, supra note 54, at 238.
57. Via v. State Comm’n on Conservation & Dev. of Va., 9 F. Supp. 556, 557 (W.D.
Va. 1935), aff’d, 296 U.S. 549 (1935).
58. Via, 9 F. Supp. at 557–58.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 403 (2018).
60. See Via, 9 F. Supp. at 559.
61. Id. at 558.
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Commission had the power to convey the land thus acquired to the United
States in order to create a national park.62
Virginia subsequently began condemnation proceedings and
ultimately condemned over 1,100 tracts and forced the relocation of 465
families.63 Many of these condemnations were challenged in court on various
grounds, including that (1) the acquisitions were unconstitutional because
they are not for a public need of the Commonwealth but instead for a gift to
the United States, (2) a different (and easier) procedure was set up for park
condemnations than was already in place for other condemnation actions,
raising due process issues, and (3) no requirement that negotiations for
voluntary sale must take place before condemnation was used.64 Generally,
these legal challenges failed and the takings were upheld.65 Today, little
evidence of the former residents remains within Shenandoah, though it is not
uncommon to see a standing stone chimney or dry-set stone wall surrounded
by deep forest.
This method of conservation, though ultimately achieving a portion
of what has been called “America’s Best Idea,” did come at a cost.66
Resentment among the displaced individuals was high at the time the park
was created and remains over eighty years later.67 Often framed at the time
as a rescue from poverty for the residents of the future park, the descendants
see things differently. In a 1982 Washington Post article on the subject,
displaced families and their descendants said, “books they wrote about the
mountain people being ignorant and all. Nothing but lies. They just trying to
make all these people up here look like they didn’t have any sense so they
could take our land.” And, “[t]here’s one man we know who still has
nightmares about being moved . . . He said he’d go back tomorrow. But he
can’t. You can’t: the structure, the network, is gone. You can’t undo what’s
done. But perhaps you can be more sensitive in the future.”68

62. Id.
63. Robert Kyle, The Dark Side of Skyline Drive, WASH. POST, (October 17, 1993),
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1993/10/17/the-dark-side-ofskyline-drive/d72e6151-6b96-483c-ab68-dea952288b6a/ [https://perma.cc/L2BR-CZ73].
64. Via, 9 F. Supp. at 559.
65. See, e.g., id. at 559; see also Rudacille v. State Comm’n on Conservation & Dev.,
156 S.E. 829, 834 (Va. 1931).
66. See The National Parks: America’s Best Idea (PBS television broadcast Sept. 27–
Oct. 2, 2009).
67. See Audrey J. Horning, When Past is Present: Archaeology of the Displaced in
Shenandoah National Park, U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV. (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.nps.gov/
shen/learn/historyculture/displaced.htm [https://perma.cc/GM4P-ZXZY]; see also Don
Nunes, Shenandoah National Park: Pain Lingers for Displaced Mountain Folks, WASH. POST
(May 31, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1982/05/31/shenandoahnational-park-pain-lingers-for-displaced-mountain-folks/740b402a-1535-40ec-bacad37743a5753f/ [https://perma.cc/73E5-UY8W]; Kyle, supra note 63.
68. Nunes, supra note 67.
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3. The Land and Water Conservation Fund
In 1965, Congress built upon the successes of the Weeks Act and
MBCA to create the Land and Water Conservation Fund (“LWCF”).69
Described by the Wilderness Society as “America’s Most Important Parks
Program,”70 the LWCF and its subsequent amendments allow for the
appropriation of $900 million annually,71 $30 million of which may be used
for the acquisition of land, water, wetlands, preservation of endangered
species under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), or for the creation and
expansion of national wildlife refuges.72 This comprehensive interagency
fund, under the authority of the Department of the Interior, has led to the
acquisition and/or increased protection of land in a number of wildlife
habitats, including the California Coastal National Monument, Everglades
National Park, Petrified Forest National Park, and Red Rock Lakes National
Wildlife Refuge.73 In addition to the $30 million available annually for the
purposes of eminent domain, state and federal partnerships under the LWCF
have resulted in the protection of over 2.3 million acres of privately owned
land.74 While legal authorization for the LWCF expired on September 30,
2018,75 it was permanently reauthorized in bipartisan legislation signed on
March 12, 2019.76
Finally, no discussion of land protection would be complete without
recognition of the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). Created by act of
Congress in 194677 and operating under the Department of the Interior, the
mission of BLM is to “sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of
America’s public lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future
generations.”78 Today, BLM administers roughly 244.4 million surface acres
of public land.79 In 1976, Congress amended the powers of this agency under
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”).80 Under Section
69. 54 U.S.C. §§ 200301-200310 (2018) .
70. America’s Most Important Parks Program: Take the Pledge to #saveLWCF,
WILDERNESS SOC’Y (Oct. 1 2018), https://www.wilderness.org/articles/blog/americas-mostimportant-parks-program-take-pledge-savelwcf [https://perma.cc/W9NN-K42Q].
71. Congressional Acts, Land and Conservation Fund, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/lwcf/congressionalacts.htm.
72. 54 U.S.C. §§ 200306, 200308 (2018).
73. Land and Water Conservation Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.
doi.gov/lwcf [https://perma.cc/M98H-4K23].
74. Id.
75. History of the LWCF, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/subjects/lwcf/
lwcfhistory.htm [https://perma.cc/63J2-C238].
76. Id.
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1731 (1976).
78. Bureau of Land Management: Public Land Statistics 2018, Foreword, U.S. DEP’T
OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/PublicLandStatistics2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N52U-2G7A].
79. Id. at 1.
80. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (1976).
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205 of the FLPMA, the Secretary of the Interior, acting in furtherance of
BLM objectives, may exercise eminent domain over non-federal land
primarily to gain access to public lands held under BLM’s jurisdiction.81
As seen from the above history, the federal government has a number
of avenues by which it may initiate condemnation proceedings in order to
acquire private land for the purposes of habitat protection and species
conservation. Therefore, it should serve as no surprise that such power is also
conferred in the text of the Clean Water Act, discussed below.
II. CASE STUDY: COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IN VIRGINIA
The overarching goal of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) is “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”82 One avenue the CWA uses to achieve this goal is to make illegal
the discharge of dredged or fill materials in the waters of the United States,
unless a permit authorizing the discharge is first issued by the U.S. Army
Corp of Engineers under section 404.83 The Corp has wide discretion. “In
deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the [Corp] exercises the
discretion of an enlightened despot, relying on such factors as ‘economics,’
‘aesthetics,’ ‘recreation,’ and ‘in general, the needs and welfare of the
people.’”84 The Corp may not issue a permit unless “steps have been taken
which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the discharge [of fill
material] on the aquatic ecosystem.”85 In order to minimize adverse impacts,
the Corp has adopted a three-pronged approach designed to ensure that there
is no net loss of wetlands: avoidance, minimization, and compensatory
mitigation.86
Avoidance is the broadest prong and means selecting the “least
environmentally damaging practical alternative.”87 In the case of a road, for
instance, avoidance might require the routing of a road along a ridgeline
rather than through a valley to avoid wetland impacts. Minimization is the
secondary-level approach and involves, once the least damaging broad
alternative is selected, taking further steps within that approach to minimize
impacts, generally through the use of project modifications or permit
conditions.88 Again, using the example of a road, minimization might involve
using a bridge over a waterway rather than a fill to minimize the impact on
the wetlands over which the road crosses. The last prong is compensatory
81. See 43 U.S.C. § 1715 (1976).
82. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006).
83. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 589 (9th
Cir. 2008).
84. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)).
85. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 202 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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mitigation, designed to compensate for, or offset the impact of, wetlands
impacts that are unavoidable after application of the first two prongs.
A. The Compensatory Mitigation Requirement
Compensatory mitigation is designed to force those impacting
wetlands to both consider whether or not it is possible to avoid those impacts
and, if so, to do so. If it is not possible to avoid impacts, compensatory
mitigation is the alternative to ensure no net loss of wetlands.89
Compensatory mitigation provides an offset to environmental costs that
result from the unavoidable impacts of permitted activities after the other
methods of reducing the impact (avoidance and minimization) have already
achieved their maximum effect.90 In other words, mitigation is required to
compensate “for the aquatic resource functions that will be lost as a result of
the permitted activity.”91
The compensatory mitigation rule has several stated goals, including
setting standards to ensure that compensatory mitigation projects meet
nationally consistent and science-based standards.92 Additionally, the rule is
designed to
make watershed-based decisions on siting and suitability of
proposed mitigation projects . . . [establish] a clear
understanding of the requisite components of a complete and
approvable mitigation plan . . . [refine] long-term monitoring
requirements . . . [establish] tools defining success and
failure, and clarification of the need for long term postconstruction management or mitigation areas . . . [and,
reinforce] of the traditional ‘avoid, minimize, compensate’
requirements of § 404 by requiring documentation of this
process by permit applicants.93
Options for compensation include, “restoration, enhancement,
establishment, and in certain circumstances preservation.”94 Restoration is
the preferred technique for compensating for wetland loss because “the
likelihood of success is greater and the impacts to potentially ecologically
important uplands are reduced compared to establishment, and the potential
gains in terms of aquatic resource functions are greater, compared to
enhancement and preservation.”95 Though compensatory mitigation may
take place on public land, credit for public-land mitigation must be a result
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

40 C.F.R. § 230.93(a)(1) (2008).
Id.
Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 2018).
Wetlands Mitigation Defined, in ENVTL. SCI. DESKBOOK § 9:52 (2019).
Id.
40 C.F.R. § 230.93(a)(2).
Id.
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of the “resource functions provided by the compensatory mitigation project,
over and above those provided by public programs already planned or in
place.”96 In other words, if a National Forest is already protecting a stream in
its natural state, no mitigation credit may be generated by continuing to
preserve that stream or taking any other action that does not restore, enhance,
or establish wetlands.
The final rule provides three primary types of compensatory
mitigation permitted to satisfy obligations under a permit.97 Those three are:
mitigation banks, in-lieu fee programs, and permittee-responsible
mitigation.98 The rule creates a hierarchy of the three types, with the use of
mitigation banks being preferred over in-lieu fee programs and in-lieu fee
programs being preferred over permittee-responsible mitigation.99
There are several reasons why the hierarchy exists. For instance,
mitigation banking is preferred because it helps reduce the risks and
insecurity associated with permittee-responsible mitigation.100 This is true
because of the “scientific management, large scale, and financial security
provided within mitigation banks.”101 These factors are seen as relieving
some of the uncertainty of success associated with permittee-responsible
mitigation and preventing temporal loss of functions during the time between
when the loss is incurred and when the permittee-responsible mitigation is
complete.102 The final rule provides that mitigation banks “typically involve
larger, more ecologically valuable parcels, and more rigorous scientific and
technical analysis, planning and implementation than permittee-responsible
mitigation.”103 These justifications are also true for in-lieu fee programs.
Between mitigation banking and in-lieu fee programs, however, a
preference still exists for mitigation banking because “development of a
mitigation bank requires site identification in advance, project-specific
planning, and significant investment of financial resources that is often not
practicable for many in-lieu fee programs.”104 Additionally, mitigation banks
are not permitted to issue credits prior to completion of the compensatory
mitigation for which they are issued, while in-lieu fee programs may accept
fees for compensatory mitigation before the actual mitigation is done. This

96. Id. § 230.93(a)(2).
97. Id. § 230.93(b).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 230.93 (b)(2); see also Pioneer Reserve, LLC v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl.
483, 486 (2016), aff’d, 690 F. App’x 687 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Within these three alternatives,
the Corps has expressed a hierarchical preference, with mitigation banking considered the
most preferable, in-lieu fee providers the second most preferable, and permitee responsible
mitigation the least preferable option.”). For a more in-depth discussion of the primary types
of compensatory mitigation permitted, see infra Sections II.A.1–3.
100. 40 C.F.R. § 230.93(b)(2).
101. Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d 692, 699–700 (5th Cir. 2018).
102. 40 C.F.R. § 230.93(b)(2).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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creates a temporal issue that is detrimental, at least temporarily, to the nonet-loss goal of the compensatory mitigation system.105
Despite the hierarchy, the permit-issuer retains significant latitude to
determine which method is most appropriate, or even possible, in any given
situation.106 Considerations when determining what compensatory mitigation
will be required include “the likelihood for ecological success and
sustainability, the location of the compensation site relative to the impact site
and their significance within the watershed, and the costs of the
compensatory mitigation project.”107
Additionally, the rule directs that mitigation take place in the same
watershed as the impact.108 The primary reason for this requirement is to
locate the mitigation where it is “most likely to successfully replace lost
functions and services.”109
1. Mitigation Banks
A mitigation bank consists of wetland areas that have been purchased
by an entity desiring to create mitigation “credits” that can then be purchased
by projects needing these credits to satisfy a compensatory mitigation
requirement.110 The wetlands are restored, established, enhanced, or
preserved in accordance with regulations prior to credits being issued.111
“Privately-sponsored compensatory wetland mitigation banks have generally
been shown through private and government sponsored research to be the
most effective means of providing successful compensatory wetland
mitigation.”112 The Army Corps of Engineers maintains a system to keep
track of mitigation banks and credits available from each bank.113 This
system is known as RIBITS, the Regulatory In Lieu Fee and Bank
Information Tracking System.114 This system may be used by regulators to
establish the availability of credits for individual projects.115
It is important to note that the mitigation banking system is a free
market system. No government regulations set the value of a credit in any

105. See generally id. § 230.93.
106. Id. §§ 230.93 (a)(1), (b)(2).
107. Id. § 230.93 (a)(1).
108. Id. § 230.93 (c)(1).
109. Id.
110. Compensatory Mitigation Factsheet, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/compensatory_mitigation_factsheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NRU3-6RH8].
111. Id.
112. Mitigation Banks under CWA Section 404, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.
epa.gov/cwa-404/mitigation-banks-under-cwa-section-404 [https://perma.cc/PV9P-TQA9].
113. Pioneer Reserve, LLC v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 483, 485 (2016), aff’d, 690 F.
App’x 687 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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particular watershed. Instead, the mitigation bank sponsor and the purchaser
negotiate the price of the credit.116
Some jurisdictions have, by statute, authorized state agencies to use
eminent domain to create mitigation banks. For instance, Texas
may take any necessary and reasonable action to comply
with a federal requirement to establish or maintain a
mitigation bank. [including] . . . condemning, or otherwise
acquiring property inside or outside the eligible political
subdivision that is necessary for a wetland mitigation bank
or buffer zone and, as necessary, improving the land or other
property as a wetland mitigation bank, including any
adjacent buffer zone, to comply with a federal requirement
. . . .117
Additionally, some jurisdictions have, by statute, authorized state
agencies to use eminent domain to take private property for compensatory
mitigation, regardless of whether or not property is intended to be part of a
mitigation bank. In the case of Virginia, this power is authorized with certain
restrictions.118 The property taken by eminent domain must be in the same
physical location as the related project, and the governing body of the locality
must consent to the condemnation for the purpose of compensatory
mitigation.119 Note that this code section does not apply to the use of eminent
domain by the Department of Highways in Virginia, which is the subject of
the case study within this article.120 The Department of Highways is
authorized to use eminent domain by another statutory section that neither
expressly authorizes nor restricts its use for eminent domain.121
However, the mitigation banking and credit system, though the
preferred method under the Clean Water Act, is not perfect:
By embracing mitigation banks as the preferred means of
compensatory mitigation, federal law and policy arguably
have encouraged destruction of natural wetlands. Mitigation
banks have created a system by which developers can easily
satisfy compensatory mitigation obligations without
thinking deeply about the development project’s impact on
wetlands. Although mitigation banking is desirable because
it purportedly protects wetlands before §404 permits are
116. Id.
117. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 221.021.
118. Va. Code § 15.2-1907.1.
119. See id. (as to condemnation by cities, towns, and counties); Va. Code § 25.1-109 (as
to condemnation by the Commonwealth and other political subdivisions).
120. See Va. Code § 25.1-109 (2005).
121. See generally Va. Code § 33.2.
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issued, scientific studies have shown that mitigation banking
often falls flat as a conservation tool.122
2. In-Lieu Fee Programs
Like a mitigation banking, in-lieu fee programs also allow projects
to pay for compensatory mitigation rather than completing it themselves. Inlieu fee programs differ from mitigation banks in that the sponsor, which may
be a government agency or a non-profit organization, is not required to
complete the mitigation before accepting the fee and granting credit to the
project.123 Instead, the fees collected from many projects are pooled together
and used to fund mitigation projects.124 “In-lieu fee projects typically involve
larger, more ecologically valuable parcels, and more rigorous scientific and
technical analysis, planning and implementation than permittee-responsible
mitigation.”125 Additionally, these programs “devote significant resources to
identifying and addressing high-priority resource needs on a watershed scale,
as reflected in their compensation planning framework.”126
3. Permittee-Responsible Mitigation
Permittee-responsible mitigation is the final and least-preferred
method of compensatory mitigation. The project permit holders themselves
perform the acts that restore, establish, enhance, or preserve wetlands after
the permit is issued.127 One issue with using permittee-responsible mitigation
is the competing interests the permit must necessarily resolve. On one hand,
the permittee must comply with the permit. On the other hand, however, the
permittee must also minimize costs. Add these likely conflicting interests to
the generally lower level of scientific and technical expertise that a permittee
is likely to have as compared to the sponsor of a mitigation bank or in-lieu
fee program. It is clear to see why, of the three types permitted under the Act,
“permittee-sponsored mitigation has historically been the most
problematic.”128
B. Recent Changes to Virginia’s Limits on Eminent Domain
Following the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Kelo v. City
of New London,129 which greatly expanded the meaning of a public purpose
122. R. Kyle Alagood, The Mythology of Mitigation Banking, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10200,
10206 (2016).
123. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 112.
124. Id.
125. 40 C.F.R. § 230.93.
126. Id.
127. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 112.
128. Id.
129. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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under takings law, state legislatures acted swiftly and with near-complete
unanimity in rejecting the Court’s new threshold for constitutional takings.
On April 4, 2007, the Virginia state legislature adopted House Bill 2954,
which began by stating affirmatively, “The right to private property being a
fundamental right, the General Assembly shall not pass any law whereby
private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses without just
compensation.”130 In defining what constitutes a “public use,” the legislature
limited the term’s applicability to the following scenarios:
(i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership,
occupation, and enjoyment of property by the public or a
public corporation; (ii) the property is taken for construction,
maintenance, or operation of public facilities by public
corporations or by private entities provided that there is a
written agreement with a public corporation providing for
use of the facility by the public; (iii) the property is taken for
the creation or functioning of any public service corporation,
public service company, or railroad; (iv) the property is
taken for the provision of any authorized utility service by a
government utility corporation; (v) the property is taken for
the elimination of blight provided that the property itself is
a blighted property; or (vi) the property taken is in a
redevelopment or conservation area and is abandoned or the
acquisition is needed to clear title where one of the owners
agrees to such acquisition or the acquisition is by agreement
of all the owners.131
In 2012, the Virginia legislature proposed even greater limitations on
the state’s ability to exercise its power of eminent domain. These proposed
changes were presented to Virginia voters in the form of a referendum. The
measure, known as Amendment 1, would amend Article I, Section 11 of
Virginia’s Constitution to prohibit the taking of more private property “than
necessary to achieve the stated public use.”132 The language proposed
represented a clear response to the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Kelo.
Not surprisingly, the amendment passed with overwhelming support,
entering into effect on January 1, 2013.133

130. 2006 Va. H.B. 2954 § 1., codified at Va. Code § 1-219.1(A) (2007).
131. Id.
132. Proposed Const’l Amendment 1, COMMW. OF VA. (adopted Nov. 6, 2012) (included
in VA. CONST. art. I, § 11) (emphasis added).
133. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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C. Applying the Necessity Clause to Compensatory Mitigation
The Corridor Q highway project is designed to provide a muchneeded, limited-access highway to an area of Southwest Virginia desperately
in need of improved transportation.134 Because of the rugged topography of
the area, much of the route of the road must be constructed through the use
of alternating mountain road cuts and valley fills. The valley fill sections of
the roadway unavoidably destroy intermittent and perennial streams in the
valleys filled and create the need for compensatory mitigation under the
Virginia Department of Transportation’s permit to construct the roadway.135
The Department has satisfied this requirement, at least in part, through the
use of eminent to domain to acquire property on which to conduct permitteeresponsible mitigation. This use raises two possible constitutional
challenges: necessity and location.
1. Necessity
Necessity is an issue because the clause contained in Virginia’s
Constitution limits eminent domain to only so much property as is necessary
to achieve the public purpose.136 The public purpose here is clear: building a
highway is a classic use of eminent domain power and, in fact, is expressly
authorized by statute in Virginia.137 The more complicated question, in light
of Virginia’s Constitution, is whether or not the property taken for
compensatory mitigation is necessary to achieve the public purpose of
building the highway. The easy answer to this complicated question is that,
yes, of course it’s necessary if it’s required by the permit. The less easy
answer, however, takes a stricter view of the necessity clause. If the
Department could have used a mitigation bank or in-lieu fee program to
134. See Route 460 Connector Phase II, VA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.
virginiadot.org/projects/bristol/route_460_connector_-_phase_ii_new_construction_
buchanan_county.asp [https://perma.cc/H6CS-Z3U6]; see also U.S. Route 121 and U.S. Route
460 Corridor Q Map, VA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., available https://www.virginiadot.org/projects/
resources/CoalfieldsExpressway/Map_US_Route_121_and_US_Route_460_Corridor_Q_as
_of_Feb_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/84TG-8V6Q].
135. There is debate about whether or not compensatory mitigation is an effective tool in
mitigating the impact of valley-fill type steam destruction. Though dealing with valley fill
from mountaintop mining rather than road construction, the following source informs this
issue. The mechanics of valley-fill for mountaintop removal mining and valley-fill for road
construction in areas of continuous steep topography are similar. See Lucy Allen, Making
Molehills Out of Mountaintop Removal: Mitigated “Minimal” Adverse Effects in Nationwide
Permits, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181, 190 (2014) (stating that, in the context of valley-fill stream
replacement, “any streams created are unlikely to support the same types of ecosystems as the
streams that were filled with overburden. Finally, valley fill often destroys ephemeral and
intermittent streams, but the streams created are often perennial streams. These two steam
types support distinct ecosystems, and swapping one for the other causes permanent loss of
certain organisms from that area”).
136. See supra Section II.B.
137. See generally Va. Code §§ 33.2-1030, 33.2-1032.
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satisfy its compensatory mitigation requirements rather than eminent
domain, does the necessity clause obligate it to do so? After all, if a
mitigation bank or in-lieu fee program is a possibility and would not require
the use of eminent domain, doesn’t using eminent domain to conduct
permittee-responsible mitigation lead to the unavoidable conclusion that
more property than is necessary is being taken? The preference under the
final rule for mitigation banks and in-lieu fee programs over permitteeresponsible mitigation gives further strength to this argument.
In the case of the Corridor Q project, the issue is even more
complicated because no mitigation banks or in-lieu fee programs are
available in the Big Sandy Watershed in which the project is located. The
Department has, however, established its own mitigation banks in several
other watersheds within Virginia.138 Private and non-profit banks and in-lieu
fee programs are available in nearly all watersheds within the
Commonwealth other than the Big Sandy. Should the Department be
required to establish a mitigation bank if private and non-profit options are
not available, rather than use eminent domain?
2. Location
Another issue with using eminent domain power to satisfy
compensatory mitigation requirements is that the location of the property
taken is not dictated by the location of the project. Generally, when a
project—whether highway, utility, or other public need—requires property
to be taken by eminent domain, the clear needs of the project dictate the
location of the property to be taken. If the highway needs an access ramp or
drainage pond or the utility needs a right of way, the location of the property
needed is determined by needs identified and directly related to the location
of the project. With compensatory mitigation, this is not necessarily the case.
The location of permittee-responsible mitigation, while usually required to
be in the same watershed, is not dictated by the location of the project. A
watershed can cover many hundreds of square miles. This disconnect
between the direct and unavoidable property needed by the project site and
the potentially remote property that could be used for compensatory
mitigation creates a cloud over the process. The selection of a location could,
in the best instance, be seen as arbitrary and, in the worst instance, be seen
as motivated by corruption or other factors unrelated to the project. Land or
a conservation easement could almost certainly be purchased on the open
138. The Virginia Department of Transportation has established the following mitigation
banks within Virginia: Eagle Rock; Goose Creek; Great Oaks; Mattaponi; Mountain Run; and
Nottaway River. The service areas for these banks cover the following watersheds,
respectively: Upper-James; Southeastern Virginia and Eastern Shore Tidal Wetlands;
Northern Potomac; York; Upper-Rappahannock; Chowan. See Regulatory In-Lieu Fee and
Bank Information Tracking System, available at https://ribits.usace.army.mil/ribits_apex/
f?p=107:2 [https://perma.cc/YM44-7RJJ].
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market at some location within the subject watershed, avoiding the cloud
altogether.
Using eminent domain in such an instance is much less supportable
and far likelier to provoke public dissent than situations where the direct
needs of the project dictate the location of property taken.
III. CONCLUSIONS
From the above review of the of the historical and present use of
eminent domain to achieve environmental goals, I draw four broad
conclusions:
A. Continuing Importance of Preservation
The preservation of wetlands and the environment in general should
remain a national priority. The United States has lost enormous areas of
wetlands.139 Wetlands support biodiversity and provide ecological functions
that simply are not replaceable. For this reason, it is critical that regulations
designed to maintain the quantity and quality of our wetlands are not
compromised.
B. Compensatory Mitigation is a Necessary, if Imperfect, System
Compensatory mitigation is not a perfect system. It attempts to create
a net zero impact on the environment by replacing, enhancing, or preserving
wetlands. Such a simple arithmetic exchange, however, is not possible, even
when the ratio is increased above 1:1, as is often required.140 Improving the
riparian zone of an existing creek will not truly offset the loss of an entire
creek in another location, and to what extent it’s possible or advisable for
purposeful “improvement” to take place is also debatable.141

139. Thomas E. Dahl, Wetlands Loss Since the Revolution, National Wetlands Inventory,
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (1990), https://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents%5CWet
lands-Loss-Since-the-Revolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5VN-VX2E] (indicating that 22
states have lost over 50 percent of their original wetlands and that 10 states have lost over 70
percent between the revolution and the 1980’s).
140. The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality requires a 2:1 ratio: two acres
of mitigation for every one acre of impact for unavoidable impacts to forested wetlands. Other
ratios exist for other types of wetlands, often in excess of 1:1. See Mitigation, VA. DEP’T OF
ENVTL. QUALITY, https://www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Water/WetlandsStreams/Mitiga
tion.aspx [https://perma.cc/U2XN-QR8V].
141. See Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1,
41 (2017) (quoting Martin W. Doyle & F. Douglas Shields, Compensatory Mitigation for
Streams Under the Clean Water Act: Reassessing Science and Redirecting Policy, 48 J. AM.
WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 494, 495 (2012)) (“The balance of published evidence . . . suggests
that current practices of stream restoration . . . cannot be assumed to provide demonstrable
physical, chemical, or biological functional improvements.”).
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Additionally, compliance with the Act can create a perceived
efficacy that may not actually exist. It is natural, when you have fully
complied with an environmental law and received the approval of a
government agency, to believe you have done what is necessary to ensure
that a project’s impact on the environment has been minimized. This could
cause project managers to think less about the other impacts of a project.
Despite the truth of the preceding paragraphs, the compensatory
mitigation requirements of the Clean Water Act serve a critical function.
They force project developers to think about what otherwise may not even
be a consideration. The avoid-minimize-compensate system of the CWA
does force consideration of the first two prongs before compensation is even
addressed. This forced analysis may actually be the most valuable part of the
system as a whole. Therefore, as part of a larger system, compensatory
mitigation is a necessary, if imperfect, part.142 Additionally, improvements in
the underlying science and the resulting compensatory actions are being
made constantly, which, in theory, should result in increasing effectiveness
over time.143
C. Property Rights Are Fundamental to Our System of Law and
National Identity
Property rights, specifically the right to exclude others from your
property, are some of the most sacred tenets of U.S. law.144 Eminent domain
is one of the most direct affronts to this right. Most people will recognize the
necessity of having an eminent domain system in general, but few will feel
that it is justified when their own land is taken. As the Supreme Court has
stated: “Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights.”145
In other words, ownership of real property and the right to exclude others
from using or taking that property for their benefit is a core belief which has
been, and should continue to be, zealously protected by the law.

142. See, e.g., id. at 41–42 (2017) (“[A]t worst, we have traded a circumstance in which
stream impacts occur and are not mitigated at all for one in which those impacts occur and are
partially mitigated.”).
143. Id. (“[R]estoration science also is evolving; even critics of existing practices have
also offered ideas about how stream restoration might be done better. And the Corps and the
EPA have been receptive to those new ideas.”).
144. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating that the
right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property”); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES xxxix (5th ed. 2010) (stating that “most scholars agree that the right to exclude is
either the most important, or one of the most important, rights associated with ownership.”);
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) (“[T]he
right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—
it is the sine qua non.”).
145. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993).
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D. We Must Use Caution When Utilizing Eminent Domain to Achieve
Environmental Goals to Balance the Perceived Impact and
Maintain Public Support
In order to avoid public backlash and to maintain support for
important and needed environmental legislation, we should approach the use
of eminent domain to satisfy environmental obligations with caution.
Protection and preservation of the environment will always
challenge the competing interest of property owners to make whatever use
they desire of their property. Environmental regulations, with good reason,
create some restrictions in the scope of what property owners are free to do.
Citizens may not without consequence, for instance, simply decide to utilize
your property as an unregulated hazardous waste dump. Likewise,
environmental regulations impose important restrictions and obligations on
projects, both public and private. As explained above, these restrictions and
obligations serve a clear purpose.
Both of these tenets meet when the government uses eminent domain
power to advance an environmental goal. It both satisfies its own regulatory
obligations and restricts, or eliminates, the ability of the property owner to
use their property. This is not always a bad thing, and some element of force
is almost certainly necessary if this intersection is not to result in a frequent
stalemate.
Environmentalism through force, however, is a dangerous game. It
is one thing to say that property owners may not place a hazardous waste
dump on their property, but quite another to say that the property owner,
because of environmental needs, may not have their property at all. The risk
of public backlash is high. The echoes of the National Park takings are still
strong in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia. It would be a net loss to
environmentalism as a whole if public backlash were to result in successful
pressure on the legislature to weaken our nation’s environmental laws.
For these reasons, I believe Virginia’s constitutional approach, so
long as it is applied strictly, provides an excellent means of balancing the
competing needs described above without creating unnecessary public
pushback. If Virginia’s constitution is strictly interpreted to allow takings of
only so much land as is truly necessary, and that same restriction applies to
takings for environmental needs as well as other takings. Government actors
requiring real property to meet an environmental need will necessarily have
to exhaust all other options before resorting to eminent domain. This is
exactly how it should be. Eminent domain should remain an option—because
it is a necessity—but should only be utilized when it is, in fact, a necessity.

